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OPEN THE JAIL CELL DOORS, HAL: 
A GUARDED EMBRACE OF PRETRIAL 
RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS 
Glen J. Dalakian II* 
 
In recent years, criminal justice reformers have focused their attention on 
pretrial detention as a uniquely solvable contributor to the horrors of modern 
mass incarceration.  While reform of bail practices can take many forms, one 
of the most pioneering and controversial techniques is the adoption of 
actuarial models to inform pretrial decision-making.  These models are 
designed to supplement or replace the unpredictable and discriminatory 
status quo of judicial discretion at arraignment.  This Note argues that 
policymakers should experiment with risk assessment instruments as a 
component of their bail reform efforts, but only if appropriate safeguards are 
in place. 
Concerns for protecting individual constitutional rights, mitigating racial 
disparities, and avoiding the drawbacks of machine learning are the key 
challenges facing reformers and jurisdictions adopting pretrial risk 
assessment instruments.  Absent proper precautions, risk assessment 
instruments can reinforce, rather than alleviate, modern criminal justice 
disparities.  Drawing from a case study of New Jersey’s recent bail reform 
program, this Note examines the efficacy, impact, and pitfalls of risk 
assessment instrument adoption.  Finally, this Note offers a broad framework 
for policymakers seeking to thoughtfully experiment with risk assessment 
instruments in their own jurisdictions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Sometimes you sit and you stare at the defendant, you get a sense that this 
defendant is just going to take a hike.”1  A New York Supreme Court justice 
made this startling comment about the defendant’s risk of flight when pressed 
by a defense attorney to only consider New York’s nine required statutory 
 
 1. Transcript of Proceedings at 9, People v. [redacted] (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 11, 2017) (on 
file with author).  The author worked on this case while at the Legal Aid Society of New York.  
The defendant’s name is redacted to protect their privacy. 
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factors when setting bail.2  Such bold assertions about risk of flight—while 
clearly unlawful—are appealable.3  This judge was at least forthcoming 
about the proprietary black box of assumptions she uses to determine whether 
a defendant would be a flight risk and, thus, incarcerated pretrial.4  Most 
judges are less transparent.  Although this particular judge happened to state 
her lack of formal adherence to the statutory factors, she is by no means the 
only judge to demonstrate this behavior.  She is the norm.  That is the nature 
of judicial discretion—appointed or elected individuals are given the power 
to fix bail,5 regardless of whether they are honest about or aware of their 
reasoning. 
Judges are entrusted to weigh various factors to issue a judgment and do 
so through the lens of their own perceptions and implicit biases.6  If personal 
intuition was not an expected part of the equation, then courts could simply 
input the statutory factors into an algorithm and render a mechanical 
judgment based on the actuarial outcome.  Some believe that this is exactly 
what should be done.7 
Risk assessment instruments (RAIs) are gradually being implemented in 
criminal justice systems8 across the United States to, in theory, more 
efficiently render parole, sentencing, and bail decisions.9  At the bail stage, 
before conviction or trial, this type of decision-making presents unique 
challenges and opportunities for reform.10  Current racial disparities in the 
incarcerated population, for example, can be maintained or worsened by such 
modeling.11  While some of these concerns have been tested only at 
sentencing,12 the increasing prevalence of such models throughout the 
duration of an individual’s criminal justice experience offers revealing 
insight into how policymakers and judges do, and should, implement 
actuarial risk assessment tools.13 
 
 2. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2) (2018). 
 3. Indeed, this judge nearly dared the defense attorney to appeal the decision:  “Let me 
know what the Appellate Division does.” Transcript, supra note 1, at 13. 
 4. In New York, judges must determine a person’s risk of flight to set appropriate bail. 
See id. 
 5. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 500.10(3) (2018). 
 6. See infra Part I.A.1.  See generally Praatika Prasad, Note, Implicit Racial Biases in 
Prosecutorial Summations:  Proposing an Integrated Response, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 3091 
(2018). 
 7. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 8. This Note uses “criminal justice systems” as a plural phrase to highlight the lack of 
one overarching “system” in the United States.  Criminal justice is mostly a local process 
driven by small jurisdictions and their complex interactions. See JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN:  
THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 13 (2017) 
(“A major barrier to reform . . . is the fractured nature of our criminal justice system.  In fact, 
there is no single ‘criminal justice system,’ but instead a vast patchwork of systems that vary 
in almost every conceivable way.”). 
 9. See infra Part I.C (discussing these models). 
 10. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 11. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 12. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 13. See infra Parts II.C, III.A. 
328 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
To date, little is known about the maintenance or exacerbation of the 
disparate impact such modeling can have on defendants.14  What is known is 
that models are subject to human regulation and they can only analyze the 
world as it exists today, blemishes and all.15  Many proprietary risk 
assessment tools employ hidden algorithms subject only to the owner’s, or 
sometimes the purchaser’s, oversight.16  However, judicial discretion is 
always based on a black box of individual assumptions, biases, and 
prejudices,17 even within a “strict” statutory framework.18  While 
assumptions about the impact of risk assessment tools on economic and racial 
disparities are prevalent,19 little scholarship has placed that criticism 
alongside the only alternative:  the status quo of judicial discretion. 
The increased adoption of RAIs at multiple touchpoints in criminal justice 
systems presents a host of novel challenges and opportunities for reform.20  
With the goal of reducing the pretrial jail population,21 this Note offers 
potential steps forward for criminal justice systems.  Readers will hold 
various opinions about how punitive, retributive, deterrent, incapacitative, or 
rehabilitative criminal justice systems should be.22  In the pretrial context in 
particular, before any finding of guilt, reduction of the incarcerated 
population seems to better adhere to the well-known maxim and international 
norm of “innocent until proven guilty.”23  Yet any proposed reforms will only 
offer broad recommendations and theoretical frameworks rather than detailed 
prescriptions for every local situation. 
This Note explores the inequities in modern bail systems and analyzes one 
of the most controversial options for reform:  RAIs as opposed to judicial 
discretion.  Part I provides an overview of the functions and limitations of 
judicial discretion and explains how current bail systems operate, drive mass 
 
 14. The Northpointe model, for example, offers a disappointing case study on racial 
outcomes. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 15. See “Not in It for Justice”:  How California’s Pretrial Detention and Bail System 
Unfairly Punishes Poor People, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Not in It for 
Justice], https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/04/11/not-it-justice/how-californias-pretrial-
detention-and-bail-system-unfairly [https://perma.cc/YBX5-4YVG] (“Despite the veneer of 
objectivity, the risk scores are subjectively defined and can be manipulated to direct fewer or 
greater numbers of people into custody or under supervision, depending on the needs of those 
administering the tools.”); see also infra Parts II.D.2, III.C. 
 16. Jason Tashea, Courts Are Using AI to Sentence Criminals.  That Must Stop Now, 
WIRED (Apr. 17, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/04/courts-using-ai-sentence-
criminals-must-stop-now/ [https://perma.cc/CRK6-SH9A]; see also infra Part I.C.1. 
 17. See infra Part I.A.1.  See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious 
Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009). 
 18. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30 (2018). 
 19. See Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment:  Constitutional and Ethical 
Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 273 (2015) (discussing former Attorney General Eric 
Holder’s warnings about RAI adoption). 
 20. See JOHN F. PFAFF, SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY 132 (2016).  See generally 
Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 569 (Ind. 2010). 
 21. See infra Parts I.B.2–3, III.A. 
 22. See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 37. 
 23. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 459 (1895); see also G.A. Res. 217 (III) A art. 
11, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
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incarceration, and may be reformed.  Part I also describes how actuarial risk 
assessment models have taken shape over the past sixty years.  Next, Part II 
analyzes the potential pitfalls of RAI adoption, offers a case study from New 
Jersey’s experience with RAIs, and describes how both judicial discretion 
and RAIs respond to correction.  Finally, Part III offers a sober-minded 
acceptance of RAI adoption, with the caveat that the proper goals, factors, 
and monitoring mechanisms must be in place. 
I.  INCARCERATED UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY 
The United States’s incarceration record is abysmal.24  While myriad 
errors, inequalities, and abuses plague federal and state criminal justice 
systems, there is something particularly egregious about pretrial 
incarceration.  A deprivation of liberty based merely upon suspicion of 
wrongdoing is legal, but subject to special constitutional and court-prescribed 
protections.25  This Note focuses on reform of pretrial incarceration as a 
uniquely solvable aspect of criminal justice inequality.  Many policymakers 
across the political spectrum are amenable to, if not outright supportive of, 
bail reform.26  States have attempted reform with varying degrees of 
success.27  There appears to be widespread consensus that reform is 
necessary, but debate continues over what form it should take.28  One 
increasingly popular approach is the adoption of actuarial risk assessment 
tools. 
To best understand the issues surrounding RAI adoption, Part I.A 
discusses the ever-changing power and influence of judicial discretion, 
affected by both individual judges’ own cognitive abilities and pressure from 
other actors in criminal justice systems.  Next, Part I.B offers an overview of 
modern pretrial incarceration and explores bail systems and why reforms are 
needed.  Part I.C focuses on the development of one proposed pretrial reform:  
actuarial risk assessment instruments. 
A.  The Ebb and Flow of Judicial Discretion 
Judges have a special role in society:  they are appointed or elected to 
interpret, uphold, and enforce the law.  The respect afforded to judges 
enforces a system of deference and trust in those seated on the lofty bench.  
Society places special reverence and power upon these individuals who are 
considered to be in the best position to safeguard the rule of law.  Yet, judges 
are human, and thus imperfect.  They are beholden to the influences of their 
 
 24. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 25. See generally United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
 26. See Kamala D. Harris & Rand Paul, Kamala Harris and Rand Paul:  To Shrink Jails, 
Let’s Reform Bail, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/ 
opinion/kamala-harris-and-rand-paul-lets-reform-bail.html [https://perma.cc/GCZ6-Y466]. 
 27. See infra Part II.C; infra note 354 (discussing challenges in Kentucky’s adoption of 
RAIs). 
 28. See Alan Feuer, New Jersey Is Front Line in a National Battle over Bail, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/nyregion/new-jersey-bail-reform-
lawsuits.html [https://perma.cc/3NX8-NMZN]. 
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environments and must balance respect for precedent against equitable 
solutions for those before them.  With limited information, they must decide 
who is deprived of their liberty before trial, who is guilty of crime, what type 
of punishment is necessary to carry out the policy goals of the legislature, 
and how to balance a packed docket of cases, each of which demand full due 
process.  These practical limitations are only made worse by the 
computational limitations of the brain.29 
Judges have varying intelligence levels and experiences, which makes 
broad analysis of their behavior impracticable and prone to error.  Yet, these 
idiosyncrasies alone are not enough to create skepticism about a judge’s 
ability to dole out equal justice.  In addition to a judge’s own cognitive 
limitations, myriad guidelines, schedules, statutes, levels of prosecutorial 
discretion, and other criminal justice processes influence their free decision-
making.  Politics also play a role because judges, particularly around election 
times, are more likely to be “tough on crime” to avoid a newsworthy 
reoffense by someone to whom they showed leniency.30  Part I.A.1 describes 
the individual and cognitive factors which limit the computational abilities 
of judges.  Then, Part I.A.2 examines how competing actors in criminal 
justice systems limit and influence judicial discretion. 
1.  The Bounds of Judicial Thought:  Assumptions, Biases, 
and Cognitive Limitations 
When rendering decisions, judges consciously and subconsciously 
combine their individual cognitive abilities with necessary assumptions, 
imperfect information, and prejudices and biases developed throughout their 
lives.  Judges are further impacted by their educational and legal experiences, 
which create a veritable black box of judicial decision-making that can be 
just as unpredictable and opaque as any inscrutable RAI.31  Judicial 
discretion is particularly influenced by implicit biases, which all people 
carry.32 
Studies have shown that judges discriminate against defendants on racial 
grounds.33  While explicit racism undoubtedly “accounts for many of the 
racial disparities in the criminal justice system,”34 implicit bias is perhaps 
 
 29. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 30. See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 112; Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 417, 431 (2016) (“Faced with strong pressure to err on the side of detaining defendants 
and bearing none of the costs of pretrial detention, judges are thus unlikely to act 
independently to accomplish legislatures’ stated goals of limiting detention to very dangerous 
defendants or those that pose high flight risks.”). 
 31. See infra Parts I.A.I, I.C.1. 
 32. Implicit bias is defined here as “stereotypical associations so subtle that people who 
hold them might not even be aware of them.” See Rachlinski et al., supra note 17, at 1196. 
 33. See id. at 1225.  Using the Implicit Association Test, researchers found:  “First, 
implicit biases are widespread among judges.  Second, these biases can influence their 
judgment.  Finally, judges seem to be aware of the potential for bias in themselves and possess 
the cognitive skills necessary to void its influence.” Id. 
 34. See id. at 1196 (“Researchers have found a marked decline in explicit bias over time, 
even as disparities in outcomes persist.”). 
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more insidious.35  For example, judges in Connecticut set bail amounts 
“twenty-five percent higher for black defendants than for similarly situated 
white defendants.”36  As this Note’s opening quote suggests, the line between 
implicit and explicit bias can be thin, but both are evident in the bail context: 
Hidden biases against the poor and minorities can easily creep into 
[judicial] decision-making.  And a growing body of evidence indicates that 
the nation’s bail system keeps many low-risk defendants incarcerated 
before trial, while those who may pose a higher risk are released because 
they have the money to make bail.37 
While little is known about the full impact RAIs can have on racial 
disparities,38 model developers have at least avoided race as an explicit input 
in most algorithms.39  However, many other factors are proven to track along 
racial lines and to lead to racial disparities, whether considered in judicial 
discretion or as model inputs.40 
Beyond biases, human judgment is prone to outright error.  Empirical 
studies have identified several sources of error in judgment, including: 
(1) ignoring or using incorrect base rates, (2) assigning suboptimal or 
incorrect weights to information . . . , (3) failing to take into account 
regression toward the mean, (4) failing to properly take into account 
covariation, (5) relying on illusory correlations between predictor variables 
and the criterion . . . , (6) failing to acknowledge the natural bias among 
forensic examiners toward ‘conservative’ judgments . . . , and (7) failing to 
receive, and thus benefit from, feedback on judgment errors.41 
These sources of error are dangerous alone.42  And they are worse in 
combination.  In many ways, RAIs can mitigate the impact of such errors by 
at least removing cognitive incapacities and the inability to see the fullest 
picture available.  Professors Eric Janus and Robert Prentky argue that “even 
 
 35. See id. at 1221 (“[O]ur data suggest that an invidious homunculus might reside in the 
heads of most judges in the United States, with the potential to produce racially biased 
distortions in the administration of justice.”).  See generally Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty 
by Implicit Racial Bias:  The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 187 (2010). 
 36. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 17, at 1196. 
 37. Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail, N.Y. TIMES (June 
26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-granting-of-bail-into-a-
science.html [https://perma.cc/HXX9-7C2V]. 
 38. See Sari Horwitz, Eric Holder:  Basing Sentences on Data Analysis Could Prove 
Unfair to Minorities, WASH. POST. (Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 
national-security/us-attorney-general-eric-holder-urges-against-data-analysis-in-criminal-
sentencing/2014/08/01/92d0f7ba-1990-11e4-85b6-c1451e622637_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/5DZU-UW3T]. 
 39. See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing 
[https://perma.cc/8BRV-3E35]; infra Part I.C. 
 40. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 41. See Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment 
with Sex Offenders:  Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 
1457–58 (2003). 
 42. Consider that most judges, and “problem-solving courts,” cannot know the best way 
to expertly address mental health or addiction issues. See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 690–96. 
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the weakest of the actuarial assessment methods appears to be systematically 
better than clinical judgments.”43  While judges and human-developed 
algorithms can never have complete information about a defendant, 
algorithms are undoubtedly better at analyzing the available information 
consistently and accurately.44 
2.  Nonjudicial Discretion 
Although the preceding section presented judicial discretion as a uniform 
block with singular limitations, in reality a judge’s level of discretion varies 
across jurisdictions.  While that discretion may be outlined clearly via statute, 
it is also informally subject to the tug-of-war between actors across criminal 
justice systems.45  Police and prosecutors name the charges against a 
defendant, defense attorneys bargain to limit client exposure to punishment, 
governors and state attorneys general influence statewide attitudes toward 
punitiveness and criminal justice culture, parole boards and officers impact 
actual time served, and sentencing commissions develop guidelines and 
policies to limit discretion.46  Judicial discretion operates in the remaining 
space.  This push and pull is most evident, however, in the relationship 
between prosecutors and judges.47 
Legislative and guideline-based changes to sentencing regimes have 
greatly expanded the discretion of prosecutors who “effectively determine 
the guideline sentence by choosing what charges to file.”48  This same power 
dynamic can affect the statutory factors judges consider when setting bail, in 
particular the possible sentence if convicted and the strength of the 
evidence.49  While judicial discretion does change over time, judges 
generally have greater discretion in the bail context than in sentencing.50  
Before trial, judicial discretion is at its height.51  While levels of discretion 
vary, this Note will view judicial discretion as pure in its absolute power over 
bail determinations at arraignment in order to compare it to the actuarial 
alternative. 
B.  Fixing Bail 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “[i]n our society liberty is the norm, 
and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited 
 
 43. See Janus & Prentky, supra note 41, at 1458. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See generally PFAFF, supra note 20, ch. 3. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See generally PFAFF, supra note 8, ch. 5. 
 48. See PFAFF, supra note 20, at 112. 
 49. These are two bail determination factors used in New York. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 
§ 510.30 (2018). 
 50. However, bail schedules reflect the power of legislatures and boards to rein in judicial 
discretion, relative to prosecutors who bring charges against a defendant.  Still, judges 
typically remain the main actor in setting bail. 
 51. In New Jersey, for example, a 2014 constitutional amendment gave judges very broad 
discretion to order pretrial detention with limited restrictions. See infra Part II.C. 
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exception.”52  Upon arrest, courts determine whether an individual will be 
released unconditionally, whether he will be released subject to conditions—
such as bail, supervised release, or other programs—or whether he will be 
remanded to jail before trial.53  When a person is conditionally released, bail 
has historically been employed as a mechanism to prevent an undue 
deprivation of liberty, while ensuring a person does not flee a jurisdiction’s 
reach or pose a real danger to the community.54  Contrary to what the Eighth 
Amendment might suggest, there is no federal “right to bail,” but there is a 
“right to liberty.”55  The Eighth Amendment enshrines bail as a legitimate 
tool for maintaining an accused individual’s liberty for a price, while 
simultaneously protecting people from bail that is “excessive.”56  What 
constitutes “excessive bail” is up for interpretation. 
Many state constitutions go a step further than the U.S. Constitution by 
creating an affirmative right to bail.  A typical state provision reads:  “all 
persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses, 
where the proof is evident, or the presumption great.”57  This provision has 
varying state interpretations, including giving different weights to the word 
“shall” or granting unfettered judicial discretion in bail determinations 
outside of capital offenses.58  Nine state constitutions simply mirror the 
language of the U.S. Constitution and protect only the right to freedom from 
excessive bail.59 
The right to liberty is supposed to be constitutionally protected in the 
pretrial arena.60  While the Eighth Amendment prevents excessive bail, it 
does not define the word “excessive,” nor does it explain when bail should 
or should not be fixed.61  The U.S. Supreme Court, however, described 
 
 52. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“We hold that the provisions for 
pretrial detention in the Bail Reform Act of 1984 fall within that carefully limited exception.”). 
 53. Moving Beyond Money:  A Primer on Bail Reform, CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM 
HARV. L. SCH. 5 (Oct. 2016) [hereinafter Moving Beyond Money], 
http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/FINAL-Primer-on-Bail-Reform.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9KN4-JYZG]. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 56. Id.  “Excessive” might even mean bail that someone simply cannot afford. See Marie 
Solis, The Justice Department Says It’s Unconstitutional to Jail People Who Can’t Afford 
Bail, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 22, 2016, 8:22 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/doj-
unconstitutional-to-jail-people-who-cant-afford-bail-2016-8 [https://perma.cc/C7QD-KYAT] 
(“Fixed bail schedules that allow for the pretrial release of only those who can pay, without 
accounting for the ability to pay, unlawfully discriminate based on indigence.”). 
 57. Moving Beyond Money, supra note 53, at 9. 
 58. See id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See id. at 8.  The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable seizures, 
guaranteeing that a defendant receives a probable cause determination by a neutral magistrate 
within forty-eight hours of arrest. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56–
57 (1991).  This right has given rise to the concept of “individualized suspicion,” the apparent 
lack of which is a major criticism leveled against actuarial risk assessment models. See Tracey 
Maclin, The Pringle Case’s New Notion of Probable Cause:  An Assault on Di Re and the 
Fourth Amendment, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 395, 41012. 
 61. Moving Beyond Money, supra note 53, at 8. 
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excessive bail in Stack v. Boyle62 as “[b]ail set at a figure higher than an 
amount reasonably calculated” to assure the presence of the defendant at 
trial.63  This tenuous calculus suggests that the Eighth Amendment calls for 
a “sliding scale, linking constitutionally permissible bond amounts (or other 
conditions of release) to the amount needed to incentivize particular 
defendants to appear at court proceedings.”64 
Following Stack, however, courts have rarely exercised any serious 
restraint when setting bail.65  To best address the discriminatory and arguably 
unconstitutional status quo, it is first important to understand how bail 
decisions are made across criminal justice systems—a process outlined in 
Part I.B.1.  Then, Part I.B.2 describes how current bail systems have 
contributed to the growing jail population in the United States.  Part I.B.3 
explains why reform is needed. 
1.  How Judges Make Bail Decisions 
Judges across the country are directed to set bail to meet varying statutory 
goals.  State legislatures often stipulate several factors for judges to consider 
when evaluating whether to set bail and in what amount.  These factors can 
include the person’s character, community ties, criminal record, past court 
appearances, the weight of the evidence, the likely sentence if convicted, and 
financial resources.66  Judges have discretion to make bail determinations, or 
“fix bail,” using these factors.67  In New York, for example, judges are 
required to set at least two of nine total possible types of bail.68  The most 
popular types are money bail and insurance company bail bonds.69  However, 
these types of bail are the most onerous, especially for people without 
financial resources.70  They are also the most discriminatory because those 
 
 62. 342 U.S. 1 (1951). 
 63. Id. at 5. 
 64. Moving Beyond Money, supra note 53, at 8 (endnote omitted). 
 65. See McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 53; United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987); 
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 546 (1952) (“[T]he very language of the [Eighth] 
Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable.”). 
 66. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1270.1 (2018); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30 (2018). 
 67. As demonstrated by this Note’s opening quote, some judges unpredictably pick and 
choose which factors to consider or ignore. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
 68. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10 (2018) (listing permissible bail types:  (1) cash bail, 
(2) insurance company bail bond, (3) secured surety bond, (4) secured appearance bond, 
(5) partially secured surety bond, (6) partially secured appearance bond, (7) unsecured surety 
bond, (8) unsecured appearance bond, and (9) credit card or similar device). 
 69. These bonds are issued by bondsmen for a fee and sufficient collateral.  Bondsmen 
organizations across the country lobby heavily for the continued use of insurance company 
bail bonds. See Feuer, supra note 28. 
 70. INSHA RAHMAN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, AGAINST THE ODDS:  EXPERIMENTING WITH 
ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BAIL IN NEW YORK CITY’S CRIMINAL COURTS 2 (2017), 
https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/against-the-odds-
bail-reform-new-york-city-criminal-courts/legacy_downloads/Against_the_Odds_Bail 
_report_FINAL3.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WDG-T7EV]. 
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with means can pay their way out of pretrial detention, while others are 
deprived of their fundamental liberty merely due to a lack of finances.71 
Typically, state jurisdictions embrace one of two reasons to set bail:  to 
prevent risk of flight or to mitigate danger to the community.72  The federal 
Bail Reform Act of 1966 prohibited courts from needlessly detaining 
defendants accused of federal crime before trial unless there was a legitimate 
risk of flight.73  The Act also blocked courts from considering danger to the 
community when setting bail, except in capital offense cases.74  In 1984, 
however, Congress replaced the 1966 Act and expanded the use of 
community danger as a legitimate consideration.75  The Supreme Court 
upheld this expansion in United States v. Salerno,76 stating: 
Congress did not formulate the pretrial detention provisions as punishment 
for dangerous individuals.  Congress instead perceived pretrial detention as 
a potential solution to a pressing societal problem.  There is no doubt that 
preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal.77 
Determining whether an individual is dangerous to the community is subject 
to the whims of judicial discretion,78 although some states have further 
limited bail determinations to solely considering risk of flight.79 
Some jurisdictions—both state and local—also set mandatory or advisory 
bail schedules, which attribute certain bail amounts to different crimes in an 
effort to avoid the discrimination and lack of uniformity that comes with 
judicial discretion.80  However, these schedules are premised on the false 
assumption that the arrested individual actually committed the alleged 
activity, an assumption that gives great power to prosecutors.  They weaken 
judicial discretion, which can take a person’s idiosyncrasies into account, for 
better or worse.  Yet, some judicial discretion makes sense.81  No person or 
case is identical, and it takes a discerning mind to identify and weigh varying 
material factors to prevent an unnecessary deprivation of liberty within 
statutory goals.82 
Rigid guidelines for pretrial detention leave great power in the hands of 
the police and prosecutors who arrest and charge individuals prior to an 
adversarial hearing.83  Judges are trusted with sifting through the limited 
information gathered upon arrest, and within the accused individual’s 
 
 71. Wiseman, supra note 30, at 419. 
 72. See Moving Beyond Money, supra note 53, at 14. 
 73. See Timothy R. Schnacke et al., The History of Bail and Pretrial Release, PRETRIAL 
JUST. INST. 12 (Sept. 23, 2010), https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ccjj/Committees/BailSub/ 
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 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 17. 
 76. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
 77. Id. at 747 (citations omitted). 
 78. See infra Part I.A. 
 79. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2)(vi) (2018). 
 80. Moving Beyond Money, supra note 53, at 11. 
 81. See infra Part III.C. 
 82. See Part I.A. 
 83. See infra Part I.A.2. 
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history, to assess the risk of flight or danger to society the person poses.84  
While judicial discretion offers some benefits of “individualized assessment” 
through a holistic view of an arrested person’s situation,85 it remains rife with 
error and implicit bias and contributes to the steep rise in the incarcerated 
population.86 
2.  Bail as a Driver of Mass Incarceration 
The United States has the largest rate of imprisonment in the world:  655 
incarcerated for every 100,000 people.87  Representing merely 5 percent of 
the world’s population, the United States has over 20 percent of the global 
incarcerated population in its jails and prisons.88  Mass incarceration as a 
political topic and national challenge is perhaps more popular now than in 
any other time in American history.89  Bipartisan proposals have been put 
forth to curb the size of the nation’s prison and jail populations.90 
Yet, it is important to analyze prisons and jails separately.91  In the United 
States, the main difference between prisons and jails is that those in prison 
remain there for longer periods of time, whereas jails churn people in and out 
at a much faster pace.92  Prisons typically hold those convicted of felonies 
with sentences of over one year, while jails are supposed to imprison people 
convicted of crimes (typically misdemeanors) with sentences of a year or 
less.93  Unfortunately, a majority of the national jail population is made up 
of those who have been incarcerated before trial without any sort of 
conviction or final disposition of their case.94  Between 2000 and 2014, “95% 
of the growth in the overall jail inmate population (123,500) was due to the 
 
 84. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275(a) (2018); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30. 
 85. See infra Part II.A. 
 86. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 87. World Prison Brief:  Highest to Lowest—Prison Population Rate, INST. FOR CRIM. 
POL’Y RES., http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison_population_rate? 
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 88. See id. 
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 90. See Harris & Paul, supra note 26. 
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justice system.  It will further focus on state and local jail populations.  Jail populations, which 
are ever changing, are estimated to be far greater than the national prison population in any 
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 92. See, e.g., id. at 2. 
 93. FAQ Detail, BUREAU JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=qa&iid=322 
[https://perma.cc/7SP2-6X3B] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018).  However, this was not always the 
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 94. See Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Mass Incarceration:  The Whole Pie 2017, 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2017.html 
[https://perma.cc/P8ZZ-B4WE]. 
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increase in the unconvicted population (117,700 inmates).”95  In 2014, 
approximately twelve million people passed through county jails.96  The 
Prison Policy Initiative has estimated that of the expected 630,000 adults in 
local jails across the United States on any given day in 2017, 443,000, or 70 
percent, of them were not convicted of any crime.97 
This Note focuses on the massive incarcerated population that exists due 
to pretrial detention in jails, rather than the broader issue of prison population 
growth in the United States.  In jail complexes, such as Rikers Island in New 
York City, pretrial detention remains one of the largest barriers to reducing 
the incarcerated population.  “Three-quarters of the jail population in New 
York City consists of people who are being held while their cases are 
awaiting an outcome in court. . . .  In nearly all of these cases, the individuals 
are held due to their inability to make bail.”98  To address the issue of 
crowded jails and bloated pretrial incarceration, particularly for poor people 
and people of color, some have called for the use of actuarial tools that train 
criminological expertise toward a fairer bail allocation system99 by reducing 
human error and bias.100  Yet, these efforts have been met with 
counterarguments focused on the discriminatory potential and constitutional 
concerns that arise when a state replaces judicial discretion with data-based 
decision-making.101 
Contact with criminal justice systems inevitably leads to cumulative 
disadvantage.102  This phenomenon occurs “when prior negative events . . . 
increase the likelihood of later negative events.”103  After arrest, pretrial 
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 99. Wiseman, supra note 30, at 433. 
 100. See supra Part I.A. 
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range from the demoralization effects of being placed in alien surroundings, cut off from 
friends and family, to the financial costs of loss of work, to the loss of reputation and self-
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incarceration sets the stage for the rest of a person’s contact with criminal 
justice systems, demonstrating why it is so important to get pretrial criminal 
justice exposure right. 
Beyond the psychological and physical harms that jail imposes upon a 
person, an incarcerated individual can lose their job, housing, important 
personal connections, and many other tangible and intangible 
opportunities.104  These effects are particularly problematic before trial, 
when a person is merely alleged to have committed a crime, rather than 
convicted and sentenced to a prison term with all its attendant social stigma 
and collateral consequences.105  Pretrial imprisonment often also causes 
people to plead guilty simply to get out of jail.106  When a defendant is 
acquitted or his case is dismissed, there is no restitution for the losses he 
suffered while he was incarcerated before trial.107  This is why a presumption 
of release is so critical108 and why reforming bail is so important to 
individuals.  An arraignment, where bail is determined, sets the stage for the 
remainder of a person’s interaction with criminal justice systems and leads 
to the snowballing of cumulative ill effects.  On a large scale, incarceration 
produces so many more devastating effects than simply incapacitating 
individuals.109 
3.  Bail Reform 
As hundreds of thousands of people languish in jail without a criminal 
conviction,110 it is worth asking whether the adage “innocent until proven 
guilty” is at all accurate in the United States today.111  Reformers across the 
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political spectrum have offered proposals to address bail systems’ 
contributions to the high rate of incarceration in the United States.112  These 
efforts include altering the statutory factors judges consider when fixing 
bail,113 ending cash or money bail entirely,114 expanding electronic 
monitoring programs,115 replacing bail with supervised release or 
rehabilitative programs,116 financing bail funds to pay small bail amounts for 
those accused of low-level crimes,117 and supplementing or replacing judicial 
bail decision-making with RAIs.118 
The end of money bail is perhaps the most popular proposal.119  While 
jurisdictions offer varying types of bail options, money bail is considered the 
most onerous.120  To afford steep bail amounts, many defendants must turn 
to bail bondsmen who pay the full bail amount for a nonrefundable fee.  
Bondsmen usually demand collateral of at least 10 percent of the total bail 
amount to secure the bond.121  This combined fee and collateral amount can 
be burdensome for individuals who are already hard-pressed for cash.  The 
real injustice here is that wealthy people can pay their way to liberty while 
indigent defendants are forced to spend a relatively great sum to contract with 
a bondsman or remain in jail. 
To combat this money-bail inequity, nonprofits in jurisdictions including 
New York City have supported the launch of bail funds that will pay small 
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bail amounts for a person who meets certain criteria, like only being accused 
of a misdemeanor with bail set under a specified maximum.122  New Jersey 
has reformed its pretrial system by ending money bail altogether and 
adopting risk assessment tools with a presumption of release for many 
defendants, which effectively destroyed the local bail bonds industry.123  
Reformers continue to debate the efficacy of certain reform options, but RAI 
adoption has proven particularly controversial. 
C.  The Rise of Risk Assessment Instruments 
The adoption of risk assessment instruments is a contested option for bail 
reform.124  Modern risk assessment tools are the product of decades of 
criminal justice debates, philosophical shifts, and experimentation.125  When 
rehabilitation became the focus of criminal justice in the late nineteenth 
century,126 individuals began to be given unique individualized sentences 
and treatments “to prepare them for safe reentry into society.”127  
Simultaneously, judges were given great discretion in sentencing.128  Reform 
efforts in the 1970s and 1980s, however, caused a shift toward more 
retributive goals of criminal justice to theoretically provide more 
predictability and equal treatment to all defendants.129  Due to this 
overcorrection, which led to increased levels of incarceration, evidence-
based practices (EBPs) were introduced to use empirical analyses to inform 
sentencing decisions and outcomes.130  This strategy was hailed by some as 
a “constructive middle ground” between rehabilitation and retributivism.131 
EBP has fueled the modern evolution of risk assessment tools.132  These 
mechanisms assess the relationship between dynamic and static risk factors 
and offer a score based on a preset algorithm.133  Dynamic factors can change 
over time, including current age, employment status, and current medical or 
rehabilitation treatment programs.134  Static factors, conversely, are 
unchangeable and cannot be targeted for treatment, such as criminal history, 
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age at first arrest, and gender.135  Risk assessment tools today often embrace 
both types of factors, with varying results.136  Unarguably, modern risk 
assessment tools are more advanced and pervasive than the basic tools used 
to generate parole decisions in the 1920s.137  Modern tools often employ 
machine learning in their algorithms to inform models that are based on big 
data sets.138  Models have been widely used in the parole and sentencing 
contexts.139  There is also a growing trend toward modifying actuarial models 
to improve pretrial detention outcomes, which tend to focus on static risk 
factors.140 
Some states do not employ risk assessments at all, and other states, like 
New York, offer judges a risk score with a full breakdown of factors, which 
they are free to ignore.  Still other states, like New Jersey, are increasing the 
importance of risk assessment tools, making them one of the most influential 
factors in a judge’s decision.141  In the latter circumstance, some judges may 
look at the risk scores and little else.142  There are generally two types of 
pretrial risk assessment mechanisms in use:  “clinical tools, which rely on 
specialists within the court system . . . to exercise judgment, and actuarial 
risk assessment instruments, which generate risk scores based on statistical 
analysis.”143  This Note focuses on the latter and assesses whether actuarial 
models are in fact useful tools for courts to employ before trial. 
In a meta-analysis related to the use of actuarial risk assessment tools to 
assess sex offender reoffending, Janus and Prentky explain that clinical 
prediction was superior to actuarial prediction in only 8 out of 136 studies, 
whereas actuarial models were comparable or superior to clinical prediction 
in the remaining 128 studies.144  The focus of these studies was on 
recidivism—a back-end metric145—but the same limitations of clinical 
inaccuracy should hold true for front-end processes, such as pretrial 
detention.  Another working paper by the National Bureau of Economic 
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Research examined simulations of RAIs using New York City arrest data 
between 2008 and 2013 and found that “crime could be reduced by nearly a 
quarter with no change in jailing rates, and the number of people detained in 
jails could be reduced by 42 percent with no increase in the crime rate.”146  
But such tools can only be successful if the people creating them tune them 
for the right usage.147 
RAIs have been implemented across state jurisdictions, such as Kentucky, 
New Jersey, and Arizona, as well as for certain federal crimes.148  These 
actuarial regimes are created for government use by both non- and for-profit 
organizations.149  Some reformers have embraced RAIs to “ensure greater 
fairness and efficacy in pretrial justice,”150 especially compared to inelastic 
bail schedules or judicial whims.151  New Jersey has specifically used the 
expected efficiency of RAIs as a justification for ending discriminatory 
money-bail systems statewide.152 
While often idealized as a fairer and more equitable option for bail 
determination, these models have also been met with skepticism by actors 
across the criminal justice process—even those who want to abolish cash bail 
cannot agree on how to remedy the system.153  Implementation can be 
difficult as adversaries across the political spectrum dig into tough-on-crime 
dogmatism154 or fear-based aversion.155  These efforts have also been met 
with legal challenges and have generated varying results.156  Yet, adopting 
such models can undoubtedly be transformative—for better or worse—and 
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present a host of practical, discriminatory, and constitutional questions.157  
These challenges, however, do not eclipse the need for reform nor the 
potential that RAIs offer for improved pretrial dispositions.158  Reform, 
through the use of RAIs, demands that policymakers carefully consider 
(1) what goals the model seeks to achieve,159 (2) who creates the model,160 
and (3) what factors the model includes.161 
1.  Proprietary and For-Profit Models 
While rarely used before trial, for-profit risk assessment tools present a 
number of challenges for adopting jurisdictions.  The Correctional Offender 
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) RAI is the 
leading for-profit tool, developed by Northpointe, Inc.162  This suite of 
proprietary algorithms is closed from public view and legislative review.163  
While COMPAS has different iterations for varying aspects of the criminal 
justice system, it is most famously used to predict recidivism.164  In 2016, 
ProPublica released a critical study of the tool’s racial outcomes, which 
found that “black defendants were far more likely than white defendants to 
be incorrectly judged to be at a higher risk of recidivism, while white 
defendants were more likely than black defendants to be incorrectly flagged 
as low risk.”165  While Northpointe’s software is one of the most widely 
adopted RAIs in the United States, Northpointe “does not publicly disclose 
the calculations used to arrive at defendants’ risk scores, so it is not possible 
for either defendants or the public to see what might be driving the 
disparity.”166 
Northpointe shared some of the 137 factors included in its COMPAS 
model with ProPublica, yet it did not share its weighting or specific 
calculations.167  Interestingly, the survey asks defendants questions like: 
‘Was one of your parents ever sent to jail or prison?’ ‘How many of your 
friends/acquaintances are taking drugs illegally?’ and ‘How often did you 
get in fights while at school?’  The questionnaire also asks people to agree 
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or disagree with statements such as ‘A hungry person has a right to steal’ 
and ‘If people make me angry or I lose my temper, I can be dangerous.’168 
The usefulness of such questions, and the likely racially disparate outcomes 
they produce, are concerning.  Yet in State v. Loomis,169 the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court upheld the use of the COMPAS model in sentencing, while 
finding that the corollary “risk scores may not be considered as the 
determinative factor in deciding whether the offender can be supervised 
safely and effectively in the community.”170  The court added that, if they 
were considered as such, it “would raise due process challenges regarding 
whether a defendant received an individualized sentence.”171  While different 
constitutional protections may be afforded to individuals at sentencing and 
pretrial detention,172 defendants are still severely crippled from challenging 
the RAI’s determination where jurisdictions rely heavily on proprietary 
models. 
This is the key benefit of fully transparent nonprofit models.  Whereas 
proprietary models mirror judicial discretion in employing an unknown and 
unchallengeable black box of assumptions and biases,173 open algorithms 
allow individuals to know how a model views them and why a particular 
score was reached.174  In 2017, the AI Now Institute issued a report 
encouraging governments to “eschew ‘black box’ tools in favor of openness, 
test appropriately for any bias and encourage staff with diverse backgrounds 
and from various specialties to help develop and test the algorithms.”175  This 
Note endorses this prescription because transparent models are far preferable 
to closed algorithms which prevent policymakers, defendants, and judges 
alike from fully understanding a given risk score.176 
However, proprietary models are not all bad.  The use of RAIs in parole 
settings offers a useful analogy for actuarial bail determinations.  Since 2012, 
New York has used COMPAS scoring in parole decisions.177  Although 
usually ignored by the parole board, COMPAS scores could provide benefits 
and increased fairness to defendants.178  Parole boards, which can be filled 
by inexperienced political appointees, regularly avoid letting anyone out of 
prison who poses even the tiniest bit of unpredictability for fear of a 
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publicized new offense, which can harm the political aspirations of their 
appointers.179  In this context, even a proprietary RAI could provide political 
cover, and some semblance of unbiased expertise, to inefficient, racist, and 
overly punitive board decision-making.180  While proprietary RAIs can offer 
some fairness benefits, if given the choice, legislatures should still implement 
transparent models, which are far superior for all parties involved in pretrial 
outcomes.181 
2.  Nonprofit Models 
Perhaps the most widely adopted pretrial risk assessment tool is produced 
by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation (“Arnold Foundation”), a 
nonprofit organization with a partial focus on criminal justice reform.182  The 
Arnold Foundation developed the Public Safety Assessment (PSA) as a 
universal tool to analyze whether a person “will commit a new crime, commit 
a new violent crime, or fail to return to court.”183  With a sample of 
1.5 million cases from over 300 jurisdictions across the United States, the 
PSA model has been applied to both front-end and back-end situations.184  
While this universal application raises serious concerns,185 the model focuses 
on limited static factors that may be the most desirable for pretrial RAIs.186  
The PSA specifically ignores race, gender, education level, income level, and 
zip code as explicit inputs.187  The Arnold Foundation claims that the model 
has been adopted in over forty jurisdictions, including New Jersey,188 
Kentucky, and Arizona.189 
The PSA spits out a risk score between one and six, with six being the 
highest risk that triggers a recommendation for remand.  Yet, the model’s 
website cautions that “[t]he decision about what to do always rests with the 
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judge.”190  New Jersey, for example, combines the PSA with other 
considerations and flags defendants for rearrests upon pretrial release and 
gun possession, among other factors.191  The benefit of nonprofit models is 
they are rarely confidential, which provides public notice of which factors 
matter to policymakers and affect defendants.192  This transparency is key 
for any RAI because it offers defendants and their attorneys full knowledge 
of the facts against them and allows the public and policymakers to compare 
data over time to remedy emerging concerns regarding model outcomes.193 
II.  AMERICA’S NEXT BAIL MODEL:  EVALUATING ACTUARIAL OUTCOMES 
Regardless of whether bail is set using risk assessment instruments or 
judicial discretion, an absolute lack of false positives and false negatives is 
impossible.  The real goal should be determining which alternative, or 
combination of methods, is most beneficial to society, victims, and accused 
individuals.  It is critical to seek real and deliverable reform rather than 
merely avoiding flawed models or frameworks without an alternative to the 
profound injustices in modern pretrial detention.  Besides the potential to 
maintain, or exacerbate, the racial disparities in the incarcerated 
population,194 the main theoretical criticism of risk assessment tools is that 
they deprive defendants of an individualized assessment of their full history 
and activity.195  Yet, this criticism is arguably a legal fiction.196 
There is no question that criminal justice systems today result in 
discrimination, unfairness, and often horrible dispositions.197  While 
criticism for the sake of criticism may be useful for bringing awareness to 
injustice, it does little to elicit real and practical solutions to the deficient 
policies in place today.  A blanket rejection of a reform can wrongly focus 
on reaching perfect results rather than better results for those facing criminal 
prosecution.  Realizing that no policy will ever produce perfect results is 
critical, and freeing, for policymakers to be able to experiment with necessary 
system improvements. 
Reformers must be sober-minded about what is politically, procedurally, 
and financially possible.  For example, in the RAI context, many fear that 
actuarial models will maintain current pretrial racial disparities,198 and thus 
RAI implementation should not be attempted.  Yet, if racial disparity 
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percentages are maintained while the overall incarcerated population is 
reduced, this reduction is inarguably a better outcome than the status quo.  
This Note attempts to cut through these criticisms by asking not only whether 
models are better than judges at setting bail, but whether one is more 
amenable to correction when discrimination and errors are identified.199  This 
does not mean that better systems should be free from criticism.  
Policymakers should always strive for improvements, especially where 
technologies or evolving conceptions of equity and efficiency demand legal 
permutations over time.  Risk assessment tools can and do lead to disparate 
outcomes.  Under RAI regimes, people of color may continue to be 
incarcerated at a higher rate than whites.  But the great potential for improved 
outcomes is, at least, worth considering. 
In that endeavor, Part II.A identifies an oft-cited legal fiction, 
“individualized assessment,” which arguably should not be used to block 
RAI adoption.  Part II.B outlines legitimate criticisms and concerns about 
RAI adoption and Part II.C looks at the recent experience of RAI-based bail 
reform in New Jersey.  Part II.D assesses the capacities of both judges and 
RAI designers to realize and correct inevitable biases and errors in their 
approaches. 
A.  The Legal Fiction of Individualized Assessment 
One perhaps overused phrase in the RAI debate is “individualized 
suspicion,” or “individualized assessment.”200  The opponents of risk 
assessment tools argue that algorithms infringe on the right to an 
individualized assessment because they compare people to a model’s sample 
average, rather than to their own personal conduct or past behavior.201  This 
criticism makes sense in a vacuum.  But the same concerns should arise when 
considering the only current alternative:  pure judicial decision-making.  
Suspicion, after all, is itself a comparative concept.  As humans, judges bring 
their own biases and memories to the table, resulting in decisions based on a 
defendant’s alleged behavior as compared to a judge’s past psychological 
inputs and limitations, particularly their experience of other individuals.  This 
is what suspicion is built upon.  Because no human assessment of another 
person can ever be made without the lens of personal bias and comparison, 
individualized assessment is, in reality, a legal fiction.202  In fact, 
individualized assessment can only really exist if a computer determines a 
defendant’s fate with a fully personalized set of inputs.  This type of model 
is not scalable or particularly useful as broad policy and may still inaccurately 
predict a person’s future activity. 
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Former Attorney General Eric Holder, when discussing the potential for 
broad RAI adoption at a 2014 National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers conference, expressed this same popular concern about the lack of 
individualized assessment: 
I am concerned that [risk assessments] may inadvertently undermine our 
efforts to ensure individualized and equal justice.  By basing sentencing 
decisions on static factors and immutable characteristics—like the 
defendant’s education level, socioeconomic background, or 
neighborhood—they may exacerbate unwarranted and unjust disparities 
that are already far too common in our criminal justice system and in our 
society. 
Criminal sentences must be based on the facts, the law, the actual 
crimes committed, the circumstances surrounding each individual case, and 
the defendant’s history of criminal conduct.  They should not be based on 
unchangeable factors that a person cannot control, or on the possibility of 
a future crime that has not taken place.  Equal justice can only mean 
individualized justice, with charges, convictions, and sentences befitting 
the conduct of each defendant and the particular crime he or she 
commits.203 
His concerns about the discriminatory impact of many of these factors is 
well-founded204 but basing these concerns on the need for individualized 
assessment is misleading.  Ideally, all those accused of crime could be 
assessed in light of their own potential for flight, dangerousness, or 
recidivism.  But judges are not oracles.  A person’s past behavior, compared 
to how others have behaved in like circumstances, is exactly the type of 
individualized assessment judges are expected to undertake. 
Interestingly, there are certain aggregate or group traits courts can 
appropriately consider and others they cannot.  Juvenility, for example, is a 
universal mitigating factor,205 while, conversely, homelessness or 
joblessness is used as evidence of a lack of ties to the community in bail 
determinations.206  These factors are only seen as relevant, for example, 
when assessing flight risk because of societal assumptions about individuals 
who do not have a home, a phone number, or a steady job.  The assumptions 
that follow from these factors are viewed as legitimate considerations for a 
judge.  However, they are not truly individualized—the lack of a contact 
person means nothing about flight risk on an individual level.207  But 
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generally, courts have determined that not having a person to contact 
demonstrates a weak connection to the local community, and a higher 
likelihood of flight risk, because of stereotypes about those who may be alone 
or who may not want to list another individual. 
Actuarial risk assessments and judges alike render decisions based on a 
comparison to the average of their sample.  For judges, that means a 
comparison to all previous people before them, including family, friends, 
neighbors, and defendants.  For actuarial models, that means the average of 
the selected sample population.208  Both activities are prone to human error 
and inaccuracy,209 yet while one has more legitimacy in law today, the other 
is likely more correctable once errors are identified.210 
B.  Artificial Unintelligence:  The Limits of Actuarial Risk Assessment 
With all their potential benefits, risk assessment instruments pose major 
legal and practical challenges.  Critics are right to fear the discriminatory 
potential of RAIs,211 their implication for constitutional rights,212 and their 
predilection for myopia.213  The most basic criticism, however, is that 
actuarial models ignore factors that might have idiosyncratic value for certain 
individuals.214  The ultimately false “broken leg” problem centers on the fact 
that models can only see what humans tell them to see,215 not a surprise 
broken leg that would prove a defendant could not have committed an act.216  
Judges, this criticism claims, can consider such unique factors while models 
cannot.  This ability, however, is a “double-edged sword.”217  Judges are just 
as likely to “rely on irrelevant factors or to include appropriate factors 
incorrectly.”218  Evidence suggests that this flexibility in judicial discretion 
ultimately does more harm than good.219  Yet, until RAIs are more broadly 
tested, human observation and judicial discretion will still play a role in 
model implementation.220 
Before endorsing the limited usefulness of today’s RAI options, this Note 
reviews potential obstacles and pitfalls to RAI adoption.  Part II.B.1 analyzes 
the constitutional and fundamental rights at stake when setting bail using 
algorithms.  Part II.B.2 explores the most vocal criticism of RAIs:  that they 
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can maintain or exacerbate racial disparities in criminal justice systems.  Part 
II.B.3 explains that finding the right goals for pretrial RAIs is critical, yet 
controversial.  Part II.B.4 discusses the actuarial propensity for homing in on 
the target population and thus becoming blind to surprise situations, while 
Part II.B.5 notes that the most fundamental challenge for RAI efficacy is 
ultimately human design. 
1.  Constitutional Rights at Stake 
Pretrial deprivation of liberty creates due process and equal protection 
concerns.221  To ensure due process, a judge who certifies such a deprivation 
at arraignment must realize that “any system providing for pretrial detention 
must be narrowly tailored to the compelling government interest put forward 
to justify detention.  Where that substantive requirement is met, a deprivation 
of liberty must also reflect procedural safeguards designed to balance public 
and private interests and to minimize the risk of error.”222  But when RAIs 
play a large role in bail determinations, a violation of both substantive and 
procedural due process may be hard to challenge, especially if algorithm 
inputs and their weights are not publicly disclosed.223  In the pretrial context, 
the Supreme Court has held that adequate procedural due process demands 
procedures through which judicial officers can accurately evaluate the 
potential for future dangerousness.224  This same conception of due process 
should be reflected in decisions that incorporate flight-risk evaluations and 
the use of RAIs in general.  Thus, an individual must have the opportunity to 
challenge potentially inaccurate or unfair risk assessment procedures if an 
RAI is a determining factor in his incarceration.225 
In addition to due process, the Equal Protection Clause proscribes the 
deprivation of liberty before trial based on explicit immutable characteristics, 
namely gender, race, and national origin.226  These classifications are 
implicated in the inputs that inform actuarial risk assessments.  Equal 
protection demands that models never use these factors as overt inputs in 
their analyses because they can lead to intentional (or facial) discrimination.  
But the Equal Protection Clause does not forbid algorithms that 
unintentionally cause disparate impact on these grounds, even if that impact 
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is predictable.227  Yet, such limited equal protection interpretations alone do 
not determine policy.  This Note explains that state and local policymakers 
can, and should, find that disparate impact, while constitutional, must still be 
avoided when building the best risk assessment tools possible.228 
2.  Discriminatory Factors 
A risk assessment instrument is only as useful or discriminatory as the 
inputs it considers.  Humans are responsible for selecting what is included in 
a model, and each additional factor can lead an algorithm down a different 
and unpredictable road.229  Some factors explicitly track along racial, gender, 
or socioeconomic lines.230  Others, such as prior criminal history,231 zip code, 
or housing status, have a facially neutral description, but can maintain the 
racial divisions in criminal justice systems.232  The usefulness and 
discriminatory impact of each of these factors are subject to debate.  And 
while the use of these factors may be constitutional,233 they require careful 
consideration and continued skepticism to avoid disparate impact in pretrial 
incarceration.234 
After all, even the best RAIs can create severe disparities along racial, 
gender, or other demographic lines.235  To avoid continued or emboldened 
discrimination in sentencing, Professor Sonja Starr argues against the use of 
RAIs altogether.236  Starr explains, “[T]he socioeconomic and family 
variables that [RAIs] do include are highly correlated with race, as is criminal 
history, so they are likely to have a racially disparate impact.”237  Starr is 
undoubtedly correct.  However, these same concerns must apply to judicial 
discretion in the bail context as well. 
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The statutory factors a judge considers when fixing bail are equally 
correlated with race.238  Yet, the difference, perhaps, is that risk assessment 
factors systematize,239 and thus institutionalize, certain factors and their 
repercussions as valid metrics and outcomes.240  That danger is real and must 
remain ever present in the mind of RAI developers and adopters.241  Judges 
are less susceptible to that replicable and systematic application of inputs, 
and are perhaps able to craft a more full picture of the defendant’s 
circumstances.242  Yet, while some model inputs can lead to maintaining the 
inequalities of the status quo, such considerations likely lead to the same or 
worse results under judicial discretion.243 
Former Attorney General Holder speculates that RAIs could aggravate 
current racial disparities,244 but, as others have predicted, risk assessment 
tools could just as easily alleviate those disparities.245  These concerns about 
RAIs are untested in a comparative sense, and judicial discretion must be met 
with similar scrutiny.246  While discrimination may become enshrined in a 
given instrument,247 the array of available risk assessment tools offers a 
variety of ways to evaluate risk, to give different weights to inputs, and to 
supplement criminal justice tasks, including fixing bail.  Current models are 
also not static or final—policymakers can continue to monitor and update 
models as inefficiencies and disparate impacts are identified, a benefit not 
available for judicial discretion en masse.248  The true benefit of using RAIs 
is the relative ease with which data can be collected, outcomes evaluated, and 
changes implemented.249 
3.  Goal-Limited Results:  Front-End and Back-End Modeling 
Modeling is employed on both the front end and back end of the criminal 
justice system.  Front-end modeling focuses on a person’s entrance into 
criminal justice systems through sentencing, whereas back-end models deal 
with a person’s ultimate release, parole, or recidivism.250  One RAI should 
not be applied across the board; back-end and front-end models must weigh 
different factors and must be tuned toward different goals.251  On the back 
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end, reducing recidivism once a sentence is served is a useful goal,252 
whereas on the front end, reducing flight risk or danger to society may be 
more appropriate in the bail context.253  This Note argues that a presumption 
of release should be the overarching goal of pretrial RAIs.254 
While this Note focuses on the front-end use of pretrial modeling, a short 
survey of how courts have viewed more prevalent back-end modeling 
regimes is informative.  In Loomis, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the 
use of RAIs in sentencing and delineated several due process 
requirements.255  Most notably, the court held that “risk scores may not be 
considered the determinative factor in deciding whether the offender can be 
supervised safely and effectively in the community.”256  This stipulation may 
be applicable on the front end as well, as the use of risk assessment tools 
could be similarly limited before trial.  The court in Loomis further held that 
RAI determinations—particularly from proprietary algorithms—must be 
accompanied by certain disclaimers for judges, including “that risk 
assessment scores are based on group data and are able to identify groups of 
high-risk offenders, not a particular high risk offender . . . and that risk 
assessment tools must be constantly monitored and re-calibrated for accuracy 
as the population changes.”257  As long as risk assessments, particularly those 
that are proprietary and nontransparent, are not determinative, they can be 
used as one piece of the judicial-discretion puzzle in Wisconsin’s sentencing 
regime.258 
The major challenge for adopting actuarial models across criminal justice 
systems, however, is to not simply repurpose back-end tools for use on the 
front end.259  Even on the back end, varying goals lead to different results.260  
Starr argues that judges often use the wrong kind of tool in order to achieve 
the results they desire.261  She criticizes current sentencing RAIs because 
many focus on recidivism risk at the moment of conviction, not once the 
sentence has been served.262  She posits that taking the effect of the imposed 
sentence itself into account can provide more accurate and useful results.263  
Actuarial models are thus only as useful as the goals they are designed to 
achieve and the questions they are expected to answer.264  Professor John 
Pfaff points out, for example, that “[t]ime spent in prison is relatively 
unimportant for parole guidelines . . . but critical to sentencing tools.”265  The 
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solution, he explains, could simply be to “produce models that better 
incorporate factors that [are] more relevant to front-end decision-making.”266 
4.  Tunnel Vision in Machine Learning:  When Hyperfocus 
Creates Blind Spots 
Bernard Harcourt, in a book dedicated to critiquing the use of predictive 
modeling in criminal justice systems, describes RAIs as self-defeating.267  
His harsh rebuke of actuarial tools focuses on the idea that, if a rational 
person is aware of the factors included in a risk assessment algorithm, she 
may act in a way that avoids satisfying or exacerbating only those factors to 
evade detection entirely.268  Put simply, if, for example, race is used as the 
sole factor in a model, then people who meet that race classification will be 
overtargeted and those who do not can completely avoid detection.269  The 
picture is more complicated when there are multiple or even dozens of factors 
in a model, but can still lead to the same avoidance behavior. 
Absent the explicit use of race, a model may develop “tunnel vision” by 
focusing more and more on defendants that meet a narrow set of factors, such 
as income level, prior criminal history, and education level.270  But a 
successful model cannot ignore those individuals who may be equally risky 
due to unpredictable reasons.271  Left to their own devices, these RAIs could 
then maintain or worsen current racial disparities in criminal justice 
systems.272 
In the bail context, where models rely more on past behavior than 
immutable characteristics, this issue may be less prevalent than at sentencing 
or parole.  In the Arnold Foundation formula, for example, the included 
factors focus on prior criminal history, violent criminal history, and prior 
failures to appear.273  These predictors are inarguably less facially 
discriminatory than the overt use of race or gender that Harcourt analyzes.  
People, after all, should undoubtedly avoid being violent and building a 
criminal record, and absent racist enforcement, these factors are useful for 
assessing risk of flight or dangerousness to the community.  Unfortunately, 
our society is not without this troubling reality.274 
Harcourt’s criticism is valid.  The factors included can lead to self-
fulfilling prophesies that encourage actuarial models to develop myopia over 
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time as they evolve to identify what “type” of person tends to commit 
crime.275  When this happens, even the legally fictitious notion of 
individualized assessment becomes more attenuated.  Yet accounting for the 
likelihood of developing such tunnel vision through an algorithm’s own 
proactive machine learning is critical for designing and maintaining useful 
and fairer models.276  Most importantly, developers must realize that as a 
model identifies the same types of people as high risk, then those who should 
be detained before trial yet do not meet a narrow set of factors, could perhaps 
evade the system more easily than if a judge’s intuition ruled the day.277  This 
could result in more arrests and more crime at the same time.278 
Further complicating this process, people do not fully comprehend how a 
machine teaches itself.279  This should worry policymakers.  But such an 
actuarial tendency can also be monitored and corrected.280  While this Note 
endorses the reserved use of RAIs, without a clear understanding of this 
issue, policymakers should avoid RAI adoption altogether.281 
5.  Human Limitations Are Computer Limitations 
As Ezekiel Edwards of the American Civil Liberties Union explains, 
“Algorithms and predictive tools are only as good as the data that’s fed into 
them . . . .  Much of that data is created by man, and that data is infused with 
bias.”282  Absent artificial intelligence (AI), computers can only process what 
humans request.  The selection of the goal and algorithm inputs is a human 
process.283  Subsequent calculations are done perfectly by a machine, but 
they can only produce what a limited human mind demands. 
Critics may prefer clinical risk assessments to actuarial models but, as 
William Grove and Paul Meehl point out, “[h]umans simply cannot assign 
optimal weights to variables, and they are not consistent in applying their 
own weights.”284  Janus and Prentky additionally argue that even weak 
actuarial models produce better results than clinical decisions:  “any 
problems present in a poorly designed actuarial method are likely to be 
equaled or exceeded in clinical assessments.”285  The difference between 
clinical and actuarial assessments is usually “more one of computational 
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power than of approach.”286  Yet, much like judges, RAI developers, 
legislative committees, and implementing officials are subject to limited data 
samples, expertise, and cognition that can poison an algorithm’s results, no 
matter how careful the designer.287 
C.  Seeds of Reform in the Garden State 
A noteworthy experiment to address the problems of overcrowded jails 
and pretrial inequities is taking place in New Jersey.288  On January 2, 2017, 
New Jersey implemented a plan that ended money bail statewide while 
simultaneously adopting actuarial models to supplement—and heavily 
influence—judicial decision-making.289  Met with skepticism by the public 
defense community,290 and outrage among bondsmen,291 New Jersey pushed 
forward with risk assessment tools and saw an almost 30 percent decline in 
the jail population as of mid-2017.292 
In 2014, former Governor Chris Christie, a Republican and previously a 
federal prosecutor, backed the bail overhaul, working with the Democratic-
led legislature to place a controversial state constitutional amendment on the 
ballot.293  Approved by 60 percent of voters, the amendment curbed the 
universal right to bail by granting judges additional discretion to use 
preventative detention for all defendants, not just those accused of a capital 
offense.294  The only remaining limit on judicial discretion is the ability to 
revoke bail for those who “if released:  will not return to court; [pose] a threat 
to the safety of another person or the community; or will obstruct or attempt 
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to obstruct the criminal justice process.”295  The amendment also granted the 
legislature broad power to enact laws dealing with pretrial detention and 
release.296  The unlikely political allies pushed the amendment to pave the 
way for the 2014 Bail Reform and Speedy Trial Act.297  This layered and 
multistep process required enormous trust that the legislature would not 
develop overly harsh bail reforms, but rather work toward the stated goals of 
decarceration, increasing fairness for defendants, and enacting policies 
favoring remand for individuals that pose a risk of flight or dangerousness to 
the community.  The new law called for local officials to implement an RAI 
to augment judicial discretion when setting bail.298 
New Jersey partnered with the Arnold Foundation to develop its risk 
assessment algorithm in order to intentionally avoid racialized factors.299  
The new Public Safety Assessment assigns defendants a score from one to 
six, six being the most “risky.”300  Scores are rendered within forty-eight 
hours of arrest, but some judges push to complete the assessment within 
twenty-four hours.301  It only takes pretrial services officers about two 
minutes to produce a PSA score.302  The score is not dispositive; judges 
recognize that the score does not tell the whole story and are still free to set 
bail at their discretion.303  Yet, while bail is “still an option, . . . the reality is 
that judges have nearly done away with it.”304  In the first month of adoption, 
3382 cases were processed statewide and judges set bail in only three 
instances.305  Judges held 283 defendants without bail because—in 
combination with the PSA—they judged them high risk.306  By combining 
both risk assessment tools and judicial discretion,307 the New Jersey Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Stuart Rabner explains: 
Most defendants will be released pretrial on a range of conditions that will 
not include money bail.  For low-risk defendants, the court may simply 
direct an officer to send a text message or place a phone call to remind 
defendants when they must appear in court.  Defendants who pose greater 
risks may be placed on electronic monitoring.  Those considered a serious 
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threat to public safety or risk of flight will be detained.  Judges can also 
modify conditions of release based on new circumstances.308 
The reforms have produced stunning results.  According to the New Jersey 
Drug Policy Alliance, prior to the model’s adoption, “some 75 percent of 
New Jersey’s jail population at any given moment was simply awaiting trial, 
and 40 percent of jailed people were there because they couldn’t afford 
$2,500 or less in bail.  On average, people spent 10 months in jail before even 
getting to trial.”309  A study of results from January 1 through March 31, 
2017, the first three months of the program, showed that of the 10,193 
defendants processed, preventive detention was ordered for 12.4 percent 
(1262 people);310 74.3 percent (7579 people) were given pretrial release with 
conditional programming;311 and 10.7 percent (1095 people) were released 
on their own recognizance.312  In that time, bail was only set for eight 
people.313  The fledgling system and scoring is managed by new statewide 
pretrial services units.314 
While statistics regarding the maintenance or expansion of race-based 
disparities in pretrial detention are not yet available, one New Jersey judge is 
cognizant of the very real potential for discrimination.  “An effective risk 
assessment must be gender and race neutral,” New Jersey Superior Court 
Judge Ernest Caposela, one of the PSA’s early evangelists, explained.315 
Decarceration has been so drastic in New Jersey that around five months 
into the program, fearing the perception of overleniency, the Attorney 
General issued new guidelines for prosecutors.316  Lobbyists for the police, 
prosecutors, and bondsmen were particularly dismayed by a model factor 
they felt was too weak or unaccounted for in the PSA:  gun possession.317  
Because the PSA is “trained on data from across the country, and because 
some states have far more lax gun regulations . . . the PSA doesn’t consider 
mere gun possession as an outsized risk.”318  After a well-publicized murder 
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by a person deemed “low risk” by New Jersey’s PSA,319 the Attorney 
General directed prosecutors to “push for detention more frequently in a 
number of cases, such as for sex offenders, for people who commit crimes in 
which a gun is used and for those with a history of being a threat to public 
safety.”320  It is important to note that implementing an RAI is just one piece 
of the bail reform effort in New Jersey.321  New Jersey has seen promising 
results, but not every national implementation has been as successful.322  As 
the experiment in New Jersey continues and new data becomes available, 
various local stakeholders will likely continue to seek alterations to the broad 
reforms. 
D.  Changing Hearts and Metrics 
When error or inequality is identified in pretrial detention, RAIs can be 
recalibrated much more easily than the built-in assumptions of all judges.  
But this ease of correction comes with a converse problem:  RAIs can just as 
easily be tuned toward greater incarceration (and discrimination) depending 
on who sets the current policy.  Judges are idiosyncratic but, as a bloc, they 
are at least relatively immune to changing political climates.  They can 
sometimes also be trained individually to compensate for any bias to which 
they may be prone.  As Part II.D.1 explains, regulating human prejudice is 
possible, but difficult.  Next, Part II.D.2 analyzes how adjusting algorithms 
can be done quickly, but can just as easily be subject to abuse and the 
unintended consequences of machine learning.323 
1.  Regulating Human Bias 
When a 2007 report was released analyzing racial bias among referees in 
the National Basketball Association (NBA),324 the league denied any such 
misconduct.325  But the report was conclusive that the effect on the game was 
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“large enough so that the probability of a team winning is noticeably affected 
by the racial composition of the refereeing crew assigned to the game.”326  
Specifically, the report found that white referees called fouls against black 
players at a greater rate than they did white players.327  Following major 
publicity of the implicit bias in NBA refereeing since 2007,328 scholars 
replicated the same study in 2014 and released the results with the title 
“Awareness Reduces Racial Bias.”329  Researchers noticed a marked 
improvement, writing that “racial bias completely disappeared.”330  They 
concluded that the media attention and self-awareness of racial bias among 
the referees must have led to a conscious effort to avoid discriminatory 
calls.331 
The same potential for self-correction and reduced implicit bias could be 
possible for judges.  As Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski explains, “[J]udges 
seem to be aware of the potential for bias in themselves and possess the 
cognitive skills necessary to avoid its influence.”332  With clear motivation 
and the possible threat of being charged with bias, judges can compensate to 
try to at least appear less biased.333  “Whether the judges engage their abilities 
to avoid bias on a continual basis in their own courtrooms, however, is 
unclear. . . .  Control of implicit bias requires active, conscious control.”334  
Absent the impetus to regularly self-correct, however, it seems unlikely 
judges will significantly alter their behavior.335  Unfortunately, Rachlinski 
adds that it is likely “judges are overconfident about their ability to avoid the 
influence of race and hence fail to engage in corrective processes on all 
occasions.”336 
With training, constant effort, and regular pressure from outside observers, 
judges can self-correct.337  But as Rachlinski notes, “[C]ourtrooms can be 
busy places that do not afford judges the time necessary to engage the 
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corrective cognitive mechanisms that they seem to possess.”338  While public 
shaming or awareness can lead judges to correct their behavior, it is unlikely 
such correction will remain permanent.339  RAIs could possibly free up time 
to afford judges the ability to moderate their own biases or offer an alternative 
to exercising bias in the first place. 
2.  Tweaking Algorithms 
The “surprise me” feature on music streaming services offers an apt 
analogy for what may be needed to prevent actuarial models from becoming 
so focused as to be self-defeating and inefficient.340  Like the algorithms that 
monitor a user’s music preferences, RAIs can begin to identify which 
combination of factors lead to the identification of high risk individuals and 
allocate greater weight to the factors that appear to regularly matter.341  To 
prevent the same track from playing on repeat, it is important to combat both 
the self-reinforcement of models themselves and the adaptive behavior of 
individuals by checking the actuarial model against a randomized sample.342  
This can prevent the model from folding in on itself as it identifies the same 
types of people as high risk. 
To avoid a similar phenomenon in the tax realm, for example, the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) has employed a special program used to correct its 
auditing model which “identifies those who are generally paid in cash as 
being more likely to evade their taxes.  As the model starts to flag such 
returns, auditors are likely to uncover more violations in such returns, which 
in turn only emphasizes the need to audit more and more such returns.”343  
But, as cash-only jobs are more closely scrutinized, other earners will evade 
taxes at a greater rate, knowing they are not being watched.344  Thus the 
model is no longer able to find “new evaders” outside the suspect type.345  
Knowing this, the IRS has implemented the Taxpayer Compliance 
Measurement Program (TCMP), “which randomly selects thousands of 
returns for audit.  By casting a wide net over all returns, the TCMP can detect 
where malfeasance is moving . . . and it can update the [model] 
accordingly.”346  Unfortunately, this means that the IRS audits many 
innocent random people.347  But that randomness is necessary to prevent 
model-reinforced biases from tainting the results.  Using such a corrective 
measure to improve RAIs could have the similarly negative consequence of 
unnecessarily depriving individuals of liberty who would typically be 
deemed “low risk.”  Yet, while the model itself may produce results that harm 
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some random individuals, final judicial oversight over any RAI 
determination, as implemented in New Jersey, may alleviate this concern.348 
Despite the possibility for this tunnel vision, and its attendant costs, 
actuarial models offer easier data collection that can be assessed for errors 
and impact as compared to judicial discretion.  These metrics can be used to 
identify gaps in the model and alter the factors, weights, and goals of an 
algorithm to reach different results.  This ease of attunement is impossible 
under a regime of pure judicial discretion.  Of course, changing a model may 
require legislative action—a feat in itself—but RAIs open up at least the 
opportunity for large-scale and uniform change.  Admittedly, an impulsive 
government could use this ease of attunement for ill, altering the pretrial 
detention population almost immediately to suit a nefarious political agenda.  
But regular data collection, testing, and the recording of risk scores provide 
such an enormous benefit to policymakers and defendants alike that this fear 
may be overridden.  As a protective measure, legislatures could mandate that 
any changes to a model require testing periods or other hurdles before 
implementation.  Despite the possibility of misuse, tweaking algorithms to 
achieve pretrial release goals is far easier than regulating the intuitions and 
biases of thousands of trial judges.349 
III.  PRETRIAL DECARCERATION:  COMBINING THE BEST OF HUMAN 
AND MACHINE POTENTIAL 
The main challenge to RAI accuracy is its backwards-looking premise.  All 
behavioral analyses inevitably look to past conduct to draw conclusions 
about the future.  While the past is instructive, it cannot provide a perfectly 
predictive map of future behavior, particularly for individual actors.  Risk 
assessments, however, attempt to do just that.  While critics most fear 
overreliance on an RAI’s errant and prophetic prescriptions, judicial 
discretion is rarely met with the same criticism.350  Yet at arraignment, a 
judge also has a set of formal and informal factors before her which she uses 
to divine whether a defendant is likely to flee or pose some danger to the 
community.  The difference between the two options is that judges are not 
regularly questioned about which factors they have found most compelling, 
while transparent RAIs clearly show policymakers which, and how strongly, 
factors are considered. 
Models are subject to human inputs, which inevitably lead to error.351  
They should perhaps also be subject to human review after implementation.  
After all, judges have the added benefit of being able to include “broken leg” 
situations that provide an extra layer of leniency, or harshness, to a model’s 
determination.352  A healthy combination of judicial discretion and actuarial 
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accuracy is the best, albeit imperfect, way to reduce pretrial incarceration 
rates today, while inhibiting pretrial injustices.353 
First, Part III.A explains why a presumption of release is the ideal goal, 
and first ingredient, for a successful pretrial risk assessment algorithm.  Part 
III.B then describes the types of factors which are most harmful and most 
useful for model developers and policymakers to include in pretrial RAIs.  
Finally, Part III.C cautions against a dogmatic reliance on RAI outcomes and 
to instead embrace a limited, flexible, and sober view of RAI-based bail 
reform. 
A.  A Presumption of Release:  Setting the Right Pretrial Goal 
“Catch and release is for fish not felons.”354  This sentiment has been 
promulgated by those who fear the pretrial release of accused individuals.355  
Yet this trite phraseology, an expression of tough-on-crime conservatism, 
reveals an important point about the political difficulty of passing reform that 
favors liberty rather than overincarceration.  Reform requires immense 
courage from lawmakers and the public alike to eschew modern preferences 
for security over liberty in favor of trust and opportunity for accused 
individuals. 
Meaningful reform based on RAIs must be carried out intentionally and 
carefully.  RAIs employed at the very front end of criminal justice systems 
must be tuned to the unique situation of defendants preconviction and 
pretrial.356  To meet the aforementioned policy goal of reducing the 
astronomical and unsustainable pretrial incarcerated population,357 a 
presumption of release is necessary.358  The U.S. legal system aspires to be 
one where a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.  Unfortunately, 
U.S. legal tradition bends toward a system of incarceration until proven 
guilty.359  To recalibrate the unjust and untenable status quo, people should 
always be presumed innocent and should be shielded from incarceration 
except in extreme cases of actual imminent dangerousness to others.360 
A presumption of release will undoubtedly mean that some who may need 
to be incarcerated, or rehabilitated, will be released to the public prior to 
conviction, leading to a false negative.  Some may flee a jurisdiction or 
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commit further crimes while awaiting trial.  But that is a necessary risk to 
take.361  The sustained horrors of current pretrial criminal justice systems and 
their lasting impacts far surpass momentary and specific incidences of failure 
or increased exposure to risk.362  Reform will require political courage in the 
face of public anger at every “Willie Horton moment.”363  The public will 
need a higher tolerance for their fellow humans who have merely been 
accused of crime, trusting the system to make the best—not the perfect—
determinations of a defendant’s pretrial risk.364  Limited actuarial models, 
with judicial oversight, can offer the best risk assessment outcomes available 
today. 
Custom models with separate goals for front-end and back-end processes 
are necessary for maximum effectiveness and fairness.365  On the back end, 
for example, reducing recidivism is a useful goal for sentencing.366  Before 
trial, however, states have voiced the goals of reducing risk of flight or 
preventing danger to society.  The goal of release meets many more of the 
modern policy aims legislators should seek.  It reduces the jail population, 
avoids the many documented false positives of the current system,367 
prevents the collateral horrors of even limited exposure to modern jails,368 
and maintains the United States’s aspirational presumption of innocence until 
proof of guilt.  Pretrial incarceration should truly be the very “limited 
exception.”369 
The goal chosen by policymakers also informs the initial selection and 
weighing of factors included in a model.370  On the back end, for example, 
youthfulness might be a useful reason to impose a shorter prison term 
because people tend to age out of crime.371  On the front end, youthfulness 
might be an aggravating reason to incarcerate someone before trial because 
young people may be less likely to attend a court appearance or to understand 
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the seriousness of the charge against them.372  A well-defined policy goal for 
RAIs is the cornerstone of an effective pretrial criminal justice regime.373  Of 
course, policymakers will believe in different theories of punishment or goals 
for criminal justice.374  But they must come to a clear agreement of even an 
overarching goal to begin to build the best model possible.  A presumption 
of release should be that goal. 
B.  Humanizing Algorithms 
“Models are excellent at assessing how relevant various factors are, but 
they have a much harder time detecting what factors matter in the first 
place.”375  At least today, humans are better at identifying what matters.376  
Better, however, does not mean perfect; humans can never understand the 
full impact of a chosen factor on a model, but, absent full AI, algorithms 
simply cannot make that initial decision.377  Policymakers and legislators, as 
elected officials in a representative democracy, should theoretically be the 
most capable of selecting the factors that society believes are instructive for 
reaching the goal of release and decarceration.378 
In selecting RAI inputs, it is first important to keep the goal of pretrial 
release in mind.379  Next, policymakers must identify which factors inform a 
determination in favor of that goal, all while maintaining clarity, fairness, 
and a sober realization that human error and bias inform many of the factors 
considered.380  With the help of experts, local policymakers should make the 
determination of which factors are included in their own models, subject to 
regular revision.  Yet there are a few factors that should be ignored in every 
instance.  Race and gender must be avoided as model inputs altogether 
because they are facially discriminatory.381  Likewise, factors that track 
along racial lines (such as income level or zip code), which may only exist 
as predictive factors because of overenforcement in neighborhoods of color, 
should also be precluded from any model.382 
Common bail factors such as crime severity, weight of the evidence, or 
strength of the case are also suspect because they presume guilt prior to trial 
or conviction.  A completely innocent person is equally innocent whether 
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they are accused of first-degree murder or turnstile jumping.  Without a 
conviction, it is very dangerous for a model to make assumptions about a 
person based on what they are merely accused of.  Note that this limitation is 
recommended for RAI factors themselves, not the entire final bail 
determination.  Judges should still have the final say on the risk posed by an 
individual to take more intuitive or idiosyncratic factors into account on a 
limited basis. 
Prior court attendance record or number of past bench warrants issued are 
useful factors for a model focused on preventing risk of flight.  For a first-
time defendant, release would thus be heavily favored.  Models focused on 
dangerousness to society may want to look at prior recent violent crime 
convictions, recent domestic violence record, and history of restraining 
orders.383  Considering the amount of time between any prior convictions and 
the current alleged offense is useful as people may be rehabilitated or age out 
of crime and should perhaps receive a renewed presumption of low risk 
without the baggage of long-ago offenses.384  An individual’s financial 
situation should not be an included factor for two reasons:  (1) it often leads 
to racially disparate impact, and (2) money bail should be abolished entirely 
(as tried in New Jersey) as it only provides an avenue for liberty to those who 
can afford it.385 
These are only the tip of the iceberg of potential inputs, but overall, 
policymakers should avoid including factors that:  (1) are overtly race- or 
gender-based; (2) are implicitly race- or gender-based; (3) are otherwise 
discriminatory; or (4) are based on long-past criminal behavior, particularly 
drug abuse,386 for which they have already been punished or rehabilitated.  
RAIs should be equipped with metrics targeting limited static factors specific 
to preventing flight or dangerousness within the overall goal of presuming 
release.387  This effort will certainly result in false negatives where some 
people who do pose a real risk of flight or dangerousness to society will be 
released.  However, reducing the pretrial deprivation of liberty is a 
worthwhile risk to take in the face of a far worse status quo.388 
C.  Preventing Actuarial Models from Becoming Self-Aware 
Deprivation of the fundamental right to liberty is so serious that legislators 
and policymakers must understand the potential for algorithmic results to 
gain an exalted presence in society.  Left unchecked, machine learning can 
ultimately erode shared national goals of justice, fairness, and liberty.  These 
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goals can themselves be contradictory, but ultimately people must turn from 
blind tough-on-crime dogma toward mutual trust and a presumption of 
release to achieve these national aspirations.  RAIs can help to reform bail in 
favor of these goals, but they can also lead to overreliance and deference,389 
a further institutionalization of racism,390 and judicial laziness. 
When implementing actuarial models to determine a person’s pretrial 
liberty, policymakers should maintain a healthy understanding of science-
fiction-sounding, but legitimate, concerns.  To that end, models must be 
viewed with healthy and regular skepticism.  Overreliance on metrics and 
institutionalized factors can lead to stale and self-defeating models.391  
People also tend to trust outcomes, even discriminatory ones, when produced 
by complex models and data.392  As a baseline, this trust can be a foundation 
for further bias and discriminatory practices, ultimately leading to the 
dangerous and institutionalized labeling of certain groups.393 
Critics rightly challenge that “while judges may rely on impermissible 
factors, it may be less harmful for judges to use them less accurately but less 
explicitly.”394  The labeling of certain groups as more risky or dangerous, 
especially by a seemingly trustworthy mathematical model, can lead to 
unintended associations and stereotypes.395  This is a key reason this Note 
demands RAI transparency and avoidance of the explicit use of race and 
gender as inputs.  Likewise, it is key to avoid factors that track along racial 
lines and to compensate for disparate enforcement in certain communities.396  
Criminal justice systems today, and judicial discretion in particular, often 
identify communities of color with factors such as lower education levels, 
certain zip codes, criminal history, and violence.397  Models will likely do so 
as well,398 but they also offer an opportunity to avoid these undetectable 
implicit biases in judges and to choose factors, and weights, that specifically 
seek to avoid racial disparities and the colorblindness trap.399 
Artificial intelligence is unfortunately prone to upholding the inequalities 
it sees in the world.400  Yet, AI developers can identify this tendency and 
address it via new programming.401  Awareness of the problem can lead to 
the intentional design of RAIs that strive for the world as it should be rather 
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than the world as it is.  Of course, this progress demands legislators, 
policymakers, and judges who are accepting of such technological and 
philosophical concerns.  Rather, we often see inability, laziness, and short-
term thinking among policymakers who may simply defer to the first iteration 
of an RAI and call it a day and ignore continuing disparities in pretrial 
detention.402  RAIs have great potential to improve modern criminal justice 
systems, but their misuse and abuse can lead to much worse carceral 
outcomes than exist today.403  If implemented, it is incumbent upon all 
criminal justice stakeholders to continually challenge and improve RAI 
design and implementation. 
CONCLUSION 
The current popularity of bail reform efforts has led to a spirited debate 
over the efficacy of implementing risk assessment instruments to improve 
pretrial outcomes for defendants.404  This interest is premised on the fact that 
there is something particularly wrong with incarcerating individuals before a 
finding of guilt.  Actuarial tools can provide increased efficiency, uniformity, 
and fairness that the status quo of judicial discretion sorely lacks.405  While 
some reformers fear RAI usage and its potential for discrimination, they often 
fail to admit that judicial discretion offers at least the same, and often far 
worse, outcomes for defendants.  Ultimately, “[g]iven the courts’ routine 
reliance on clinical risk assessment to support long-term liberty deprivation, 
it is illogical to exclude demonstrably more reliable . . . tools.”406  RAIs also 
allow for improved data collection to more easily identify inequities and 
errors in pretrial detention. 
In all, RAIs provide pretrial regimes with renewed reliability outside the 
black box of judicial discretion.  However, RAIs should never be adopted 
absent specific safeguards.407  Without full transparency, regular validation, 
and the pretrial goal of a presumption of release, RAIs will likely do much 
more harm than good by exacerbating the racial inequalities in the current 
unacceptable status quo and even increasing the already massive jail 
population.408  A careful implementation of RAIs can help reduce current 
incarceration levels and improve criminal justice outcomes.  As the title of 
this Note suggests, however, algorithmic determinations—as they operate 
today—should never have the final say in an individual’s pretrial detention. 
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Like the notorious HAL from the film 2001:  A Space Odyssey, RAIs can 
be an important advancement in criminal justice reform, yet humans must 
maintain a healthy awareness of their potential to become overtrusted or more 
powerful than anticipated.409  Actuarial risk assessment tools can only 
provide a map toward decarceration.  For now, well-trained and informed 
judges must still navigate individual defendants through the critical pretrial 
moment, which sets the stage for all future interactions with criminal justice 
systems. 
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